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Social
and Ethical
Criticism:
A Contextualist Overview

Eugene Paul Nassar

Eugene Paul Nassar, Professor of
English at Utica College of Syracuse
University, has written studies of
Wallace Stevens and Ezra Pound,
several collections of literary essays,
and numerous articles on poetry. A
former Rhodes Schoiar, Professor
Nassar received his Ph.D. from
Cornell in 1962. He has also taught
at Hamilton College.

I. Eugene Paul Nassar,
The Rape of Cinderella: Essays
in Literary Continuity (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press , 1970).

2. Eugene Paul Nassar, ''Essays:
Critical and Metacn'tical"
(unpublished).

Published by SURFACE, 1980

I n the decade after World War II, literary cnuosm in
America was dominated by the voices of the New Criticism: John
Crowe Ransom at Kenyon College; R. P. Blackmur at
Princeton; William Wimsatt, Rene Wellek, and Cleanth Brooks
at Yale; and others. Their shared concern was for the integrify of
the art work-its authority and uniqueness. They saw the
business of criticism as the close analysis of the tone and texture
of the given text; hence their label of contextualists. It is my view
-and I was a student of Ransom's at Kenyon in the fiftiesthat such contextual analysis is what should properly be called
criticism; all other operations with or upon a literary text might
better be called scholarship or metacriticism (i.e., beyond
criticism). Metacriticism encompasses the enormous range of
speculations, abstractions, and categorizations about life in
general and the place of the arts in particular.
A metacritical position by definition is not focused on a given
unique work of art; hence analysis of any work wherein that
position is given primary attention is likely to be tangential and
partial, however stimulating the meta critical position itself. Yet
one cannot rest with accurate analysis of another's imaginative
world; one naturally wants to live in one's own. Ho~ then to
satisfy, at least partially, both passions- the passion for accurate
analysis and the passion for imaginative synthesis?
In previous books of mine on the poetry of Wallace Stevens
and Ezra Pound, I closely analyzed the difficult texts of these
poets from the perspective of the New Criticism . In The Rape of
Cinderella I attempted to establish the idea of continuity as a
modest bridge between criticism and metacriticism, arguing that
continuity is a fundamental law in works of art and a fundamental need in the human spirit. 1 The literary essays in that
work find their natural sequel in my recently completed Essays:
Crz'tical and Metacritical, from which the material in this paper
is derived. 2 The questions I asked myself in preparation for the
Essays were these: To what extent can the principles of contextual
1
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criticism be applied to the analysis of social and ethical contexts?
and, How useful is the aesthetic idea of continuity in metacritical
speculations that concern values in general?
What is apparent in a survey of the literature on social
contexts- as in the literature on art - is a confusion of scholarship, criticism, and metacriticism. A writer may gather data
competently or in a sloppy and inaccurate fashion and may,
in either case, assume a contribution to sound social analysis or
criticism. Yet very little skill may be exhibited in sensing the
presence (or absence) of continuities implicit in the data. Finally,
and as _usually happens, the writer may have metacritical
predilections- preconceptions concerning sociology, psychology, politics, economics, history, religion, what you will that predispose the analysis of a social context. One's ultimate
metacritical positions need not hinder accurate and precise
social scholarship and criticism, although they usually do. For all
the brilliance in, say, William Graham Sumner's exposition of
the relativity of social values in his Folkways, his dislike for
metaphysics slights the other side of the human dilemma: man's
need for values in which he can believe with some absoluteness. 3
It is this other side of the equation- the response to experience by those whose thought touches on the metacritical
need for faith-that deepens and enriches what seems to me the
best sociological criticism of our time:

3. William Graham Sumner.
Folkways (Boston: Ginn, 1940).

The substance of all religion is . .. deeply rooted in human life; it
grows out of the necessities of life. In other words, religion fulfils a
definite cultural function in every human society. This is not a
platitude. It contains a scientific refutation of the repeated attacks on religion by the less enlightened rationalists. If religion is
indispensable to the integration of the community, just because it
satisfies spiritual needs by giving man certain truths and teaching
him how to use these truths, then it is impossible to regard
religion as a trickery, as an "opiate for the masses," as an invention of priests, capitalists, or any other servants of vested interests ... .
Let us work for the maintenance of the eternal truths which have
guided mankind out of barbarism to culture, and the loss of
which seems to threaten us with barbarism again. The rationalist
and agnostic must admit that even if he himself cannot accept
these truths, he must at least recognize them as indispensable
pragmatic figments without which civilization cannot exist. 4
Any religion, while it lasts, and on its own level, gives an apparent
meaning to life, provides the framework for a culture, and protects the mass of humanity from boredom and despair. 5
But though history may be capable either of assisting or of
paralysing new religious experiences, it can never manage to
abolish the need for religious experience. 6

All three of these important voices in twentieth-century thought
are theists of one sort or another. All focus, at least here, on the
simple need for faith, belief, values, or at the very least "indispensable pragmatic figments."
A fourth voice:

4 . Bronislaw Malinowski, in Theon·es
of Society, ed. T. Parsons et al.,
vol. 2 (New York: Free Press
of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 1094- 5.
5. T.S. Eliot, Notes towards the
Definition of Culture (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Harvest Books, 1949), p. 106.
6. Mircea Eliade, "Conclusions,"
in Patterns in Comparative Religion
(New York: New American Library,
Meridian Books, 1963), pp. 464 - 5.

To believe in God is to longfor His existence and, further, it is to
act as if He existed: it is to live by this longing and to make it the
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7. Miguel de Unamuno ,
the Tragic Sense of Life (New York :
Dover, 1954). pp. 184- 5.

inner spn·ng of our action. This longing or hunger for divinity
begets hope, hope begets faith , and faith and hope beget charity.
Of this divine longing is born our sense of beauty, offinality, of
goodness. 7

But I have jumped too far too quickly; perhaps most readers
are not willing to go so far at this point, or at any point. There
are, however, wide areas of possible agreement on methodology
and approach before we need part ways down separate metacritical paths.
Ruth Benedict speaks of the integration of a culture and
Malinowski of the integration of the community, both
recognizing the simple necessity for order, coherence, and
continuity upon which much mental and psychic activity may
rest. Emile Durkheim depicts a man in a state of anomie - man in
a nineteenth -century industrial landscape lacking a satisfying
social context, living a life without meaningful continuity or significant coherence, man bewildered or lost in a chaotic and painful existence. This is an anticipation of Eliot's Waste Land of
twentieth-century industrial society. Eliot's sense is that man lives
in boredom or despair if he is deprived of a sense of belonging to
some sort of order, communitas, or vital context. Charles Horton
Cooley asserts that the individual self is in good measure defined
by the richness or poverty of the immediate social context in
which he has found himself:
The view here maintained is that human nature is not something
existing separately in the individual . . .. It is the nature which is
developed and expressed in those simple, face-to face groups that
are somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the family , the
playground, and the neighborhood. In the essential similan·ty of
these is to be found the basis, in expen·ence, for similar ideas and
sentiments in the human mind. In these, everywhere, human
nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he
cannot acquire it except through fellowshzp, and it decays in
isolation.
What else can human nature be than a trait of primary groups.'
Surely not an attn'bute of the separate individual- supposing
there were any such thing- since its typical characteristics, such
as affection, ambition, vanity, and resentment, are inconceivable
apart from society. If it belongs, then, to man in association,
what kind or degree of association is required to develop it.1
Evidently nothing elaborate, because elaborate phases of society
are transient and diverse, while human nature is comparatively
stable and universal. In short the family and neighborhood life is
essential to its genesis and nothing more is . . . .

8. Charles Horton Cooley.
Social Organization
(New York, Scribner's, 1916).
pp. 29-31.

Published by SURFACE, 1980

We must see and feel the communal life of family and local
groups as immediate facts, not as combinations of something
else. And perhaps we shall do this best by recalling our own experience and extending it through sympathetic observation. 8

Cooley's view reinforces what my own experience in life and
literature has taught me. As one moves from family to clan, to
village, to country, and finally to a sense of internationalism, the
passional ties become more and more vaporous, less and less
subjectively meaningful, valuable, or loved. The possibility of
living within a graceful, harmonious whole, consonant in all of
its parts, diminishes with the increasing complexity of the diverse
elements within the whole. The relativity, the purely

3

I0

, 5 I IV\C03E 3Ci lOLA I\

Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991), Vol. 1, Iss. 2 [1980], Art. 14

"normative" nature, of the values cherished within a given social
context may be clear when different contexts are objectively compared. But no less clear should be the necessity for
coherence and continuity of those same values within a specific
culture - so that the values can provide a harmony that seems
absolute enough to the large part of the citizenry living within
the context.
The social critic must evaluate a given social framework not in
terms of the values he brings extrinsically to the study but rather
in terms of the continuity and coherence of the values which
have developed within that milieu. He may later judge
the context on a scale of metacritical value that is personal to
him or to the group to which he belongs; however, he will not
then be a social critic but rather a metacritical advocate, aware
of doing something different and, it is hoped, honest about it.
Being a social critic and being a citizen of a given society are
likewise different actions; both are laudable, but the confusion
of the two processes, compounded with a strong dose of
arrogance , is an all too-familiar observed condition :
We can also learn to respect every other culture as a whole,
however inferior to our own it may appear, or however justly we
may disapprove of some features of it: the deliberate destruction
of another culture as a whole is an irreparable wrong, almost as
evil as to treat human beings like animals. 9

9. Eliot, Definition of Culture,
pp . 139- 40.

The true social critic will have Keats's "negative capability."
That is, he will have the ability to empathize with the mores, the
folkways, the configurations, the tone of the culture he is
investigating: the ability to feel its rhythms, its continuities, its
beauties (however meager they may seem); the ability to assess
whether the culture does in fact provide to the large majority of
its citizens some depth, richness, and sense of joy in belonging.
The critic must then be able to articulate these assessments. The
process repeated will breed understanding and tolerance ; it will
also breed some skepticism about the possibility or desirablity of
the achievement of those millennia! dreams of a society where all
human values are present and all human evils excluded. It will
affirm, in Eliot's terms, a love of diversity, of local particularity:
For it must follow from what I have already pleaded about the
value of local cultures, that a world culture which was simply a
uniform culture would be no culture at all. We should have a
humanity de-humanized . It would be a nightmare. But on the
other hand, we cannot resign the idea of world-culture
altogether . .. .
We can only conceive it, as the logical term of relations between
cultures. just as we recognize that the parts of Britain must have
in one sense, a common culture, though this common culture is
only actual in diverse local manifestations, so we must aspire to a
common world culture, which will yet not diminish the particularity of the constituent parts. 10

10. Ibid. , p. 136 .

As social critic and metacritic , T.S . Eliot has come in for
some hard knocks; Ezra Pound, his friend and peer, much more
so. They both felt, however, that they were fighting the good
fight and, in most ways, the same fight:
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11. Ezra Pound , "Interview with Ezra
Pound," Paris Review 28 (1962): 43.

12. Ezra Pound, the Cantos of Ezra
Pound, Cantos 1- 117 (New York: New
Directions, 1970), pp. 689 , 698- 9,
707 - ll, 749, 772.

Another struggle has been the struggle to keep the value ofa local
and particular character, of a particular culture in this awful
maelstrom, this awful avalanche toward uniformity. The whole
fight is for the conservation of the individual soul. 11

Pound in The Cantos:
Earth and water dye the wind in your valley . ..
. . .feelings have the colour of nature . . .
Manners are from earth and from water
They arise out of hills and streams
The spirit of air is of the country
Mens manners cannot be one
(same, identical) . ..
Different each, different customs
but one root in the equities . . .
Hills and streams colour the air,
vigour, tranquility, not one set of rules.
Vigour, quietude, are of place .. .
Different each, different customs
But one root in the equities ...
Ancestral spring making breed, a pattern . . ..
& with Chou rite at the root of it
The root is thru all of it . . .
One village in order,
one valley will reach the four seas .
. . . village usage
to see what style for the casting
Filiality and fraternity are the root,
Talents to be considered as branches.
Precise terminology is the first implement .
dish and container . ...
Unitas Charitatis
consuetudo diversa
{The unity of chan'ty, the diversity of customs], . . .
Time mother of Manors
Nor can the King create a new custom . ... 12

Pound has "no dogma" but loves the local manifestations of
man's need to venerate - as in the ancient Chinese rituals of
muan bpo, or the Li Ki, or the Confucian vision; or the
Eleusinian rites of ancient Greece; or a priest's first mass in a
contemporary Italian village. "Art is local," "temples, plural,"
"all gates are holy," are iterated motifs in the late Cantos. All
of this may bring us to Yeat's "Prayer for my Daughter"
(lines 4 7- 8, 73-80) :
0 may she live like some green laurel
Rooted in one dear perpetual place . . .
And may her bridgroom bn'ng her to a house
Where ails accustomed, ceremonious;
For arrogance and hatred are the wares
Peddled in the thoroughfares.
How but t'n custom and in ceremony
Are innocence and beauty bam.~
Ceremony's a name for the n'ch hom,
And custom for the spreadt'ng laurel tree.

And to Simone Weil's The Need for Roots:
The degree of respect owing to human collectivities is a very high
one, for several reasons.
To start with, each is unique, and, if destroyed, cannot be replaced. One sack of com can always be substituted for another
sack of com. The food that collectivity supplies, for the souls of
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those who form part of it has no equivalent in the entire universe.
Secondly, because of its continuity, a collectivity is already
moving forward into the future. It contains food, not only for the
souls of the living, but also for the souls of beings yet unborn
which are to come into the world during the immediately succeeding centuries.
Lastly, due to this same continuity, a collectivity has its roots in
the past. It constitutes the sole agency for preserving the spiritual
treasures accumulated by the dead, the sole transmitting agency
by means of which the dead can speak to the living.
But it does not follow from this that collectivities are superior to
human beings.
It very often happens that the roles are reversed. There are collectivities which, instead of serving as food, do just the opposite: they
devour souls. 13

One may label such articulations as conservative, which has
often been done ; but political labels never do for the intensely
realized experiences of intensely realized imaginations. Yeats,
Eliot , and Pound are among the handful of great poets of our
century, and to dismiss their social meditations - and those of
Simone Wei!, to whom they are kin in both substance and
realization - as crankish or conservative will not finally diminish
them. The passages breathe an awareness of the evils of
collectivities, of stagnant or tyrannical societies, upon which the
great majority of social and political literature has focused since
the romantic movement. But they all emphasize what needs now
to be emphasized: the good , the blessings, the need of vital social
contexts and continuities.

13. Simone Wei!, The Need for Roots,
trans. A . Wills (New York: Harper
& Row, 1971), pp. 8 - 9.

Further, the blessings are , for these observers, primarily found
where Charles Cooley found them - in the family and the
neighborhood or, if beyond, in a national or international unity
based not on uniformity of culture but on the welcome diversity
of local contexts. It is in the local or regional contexts that the
citizen seems to flourish. And it is there too that the social critic
can best function , where he can view the unique local context
and its comprehensibility, as the critic in the arts can view the
unique created aesthetic object.

I n summary, the dilemma concerning the apparent relativity
of values, the impermanence of things, set against the mind's
hunger for absoluteness of values and permanence of self, is
most capable of resolution at the contextual level in art and in
society. Hart Crane has effectively articulated the contextualist
aesthetic in poetry and, by implication, the contextualist
approach to cultures:
It may not be possible to say that there is, strictly speaking, any
"absolute" experience. But it seems evident that certain aesthetic
experience (and this may for a time engross the total faculties of
the spectator) can be called absolute, inasmuch as it approximates a formally convincing statement of a conception or apprehension of life that gains our unquestioning assent, and under
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the conditions of which our imagination is unable to suggest a
further detail consistent with the design of the aesthetic whole .. . .
Such a poem is at least a stab at a truth, and to such an extent
~ay be ~fJferentiated from other kinds of poetry and called
absolute ... .
I found that I was really building [in The Bridge] a bridge between so-called classic experience and many divergent realities of
our seething, confused cosmos of today, which has no formulated
mythology yet for classic poetic reference or for religious
exploitation . ...

14 . Crane quotes are from Philip
Horton, Hart Crane: The Life of an
American Poet (New York: Norton ,
1937) , pp. 323, 325 - 6, 343.

Plato doesn't live today because of the intrinsic "truth" of his
statements, their only living truth today consists in the 'Jact" of
their harmonious relationshzp to each other. This grace is, or partakes of, poetry. 14

The "assent" of paragraph 1 is emotional: the need of the will for
absolutes is temporarily satisfied by the poem's contextual
harmony or intrinsic grace; so with social contexts. The fact
that, abstractly considered, human values and truth seem
merely relative does not deny the totally engrossing hold of a
context and its "mythology" upon the responsive imagination.
One can, for instance, hardly overestimate the pull of family,
village, and local loves on the human spirit that has known them.
This is partly so because for many, as Cooley asserts, to lose one's
context of local loves is to lose one's sense of self.
The local context may be a place where family or friends or
memories are; or a place in the mind, where a store of things
loved is kept. In either case the local context provides a center, a
focus, a place to come home to when the periphery-one's life
beyond the local loves, however good- is not sufficient to
sustain one.
The center of one's loves cannot by definition include all
things worthy to love; it must of necessity be a selection from the
myriad possibilities of living a good life: hence the possibility of
many different centers (that is, pluralism); hence too the
necessity of exclusion of much good from the center. It is very
hard to give up good and beautiful things to love, other graceful
patterns of life, so as to hold onto one's center; but there will be
no center at all if one does not do so.
Thus there must be a self-imposition of imperatives in one's
social and ethical being. Consistency of tone in life can be seen as
a measure of ethical quality. As we use the word continuity in
criticism, so we may use it in ethics. The flow of emotional logic
would run something like this: One must stay loyal and faithful
to one's center to keep that center. No amount of peripheral joy
can make up for the loss of continuity at the center of the soul.
One is measured socially and ethically by continuity of actions,
not only by others of some depth of insight but also, and more
importantly, by one's self. When a person acts in ways that do
not form a continuum with the dreams by which he has chosen to
be defined, there follows a gradual loss of his emotional center.
The realization of this loss need not be rational; more likely it will
be intuitive and emotional:
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M'amour, m'amour
what do I love and
where are you .~
That I lost my center
fighting the world,
The dreams clash
and are shatteredand that I tried to make a paradiso
t errestre . 15

To act out the imperatives of one's center is to be seen, then,
not only as obligation but also as privilege , since it allows keeping
what one "lovest well" as one's "true heritage" (Canto 81). In this
context, absolute freedom to do what one wants is clearly seen as
a prison, for it will sooner or later lock a person from his center,
as one dream context shatters another. If love between people
is to have any continuity, it must be the love of a shared center,
of a shared dream, of shared obligations. Freedom, then,
is the opportunity, the privilege, of carrying out the obligations to what one loves. Thus we can say that life without
obligations is meaningless. 16
The continuity and quality of a social context, or the acts or
an individual within it, can be assessed only if one has rightly
understood the nature of the shared dreams , the central
attitudes, that impel the social process or the individual who is
part of that context. As the literary critic must judge the work of
art by its continuity, by the inner harmony of both the structural
principles and the smallest details of execution, so must the
social critic respond both to the central attitudes toward life in a
given social context and to the unique details of daily life within
that context. Intuition, insight, and the artist's gift of empathy
with unique context are more necessary here than data
gathering; these qualities of spirit are certainly more useful than
any imposition upon the data of precut patterns of categories
that relate to societies in general. It is the artist in the social or
ethical critic that generates the true criticism; not the
scholarship, not the metacritical position.
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15. Pound , Cantos, Canto 117, p . 802 .

16. Without an appeal to the will of
God in ethical discussion, we fall back
to the will of man , to illusions of
absolutism, to the logic of situations,
to play principles, i.e. , to the totally
engrossing hold of a given aesthetic or
social context. In such a diminished
condition, we can abstractly examine
the situation - as , for example, G. E.
Moore does in his Ethics (London :
Oxford University Press , 1912 , 1949),
especially in his last chapter , "Intrinsic
Value" ; or we can dramatize the
ethical distinctions possible within a
social context, as Henry Fielding does
in Tomjones.
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